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Abstract
This article presents a component verification platform called Vercors providing means to analyse the
behaviour properties of applications built from distributed components. From the behavioural specification
of primitive components, and from the architectural description of the composite components, our tools
build models encoding the interactions between the components, suitable for analysis by model-checking
tools. The models are hierarchical and parameterized, expressing in a compact way the system behaviour.
Then we have tools for instantiating those parameterized models using finite abstractions, and producing
input for state-of-the-art verification tools. Our current work also targets the generation of models that
include controllers modelling the dynamic management of architectural transformation of an application,
such as changes in bindings or replacement of sub-components. We describe the existing tools, give tracks
for further developments and show how realistic case-studies can be model-checked using our platform.
Keywords: Hierarchical components, distributed asynchronous components, formal verification,
behavioural specification, model-checking.
1 Introduction
Component programming has gained attention these last years due to the need of
more reliable software. Through the reuse of software, designers are able to speed
up their development process and avoid falling into unnecessary bugs.
Component programming proposes to split the system into smaller pieces of
software that interact through well defined frontiers, called interfaces. In case of the
Fractal [6] component model, new components (called composites) can be created by
composing existing (and smaller) components in a hierarchical fashion, enhancing
the reusability of component libraries.
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Components may be bound through their interfaces if typing requirements are
met, ensuring a basic compatibility. Although Fractal clearly exposes both provided
and required services (method signatures) of each component through its interfaces,
it is well-known that static typing of bound interfaces is not enough for guarantee-
ing a correct assembly of components: even if they statically match their interfaces,
off-the-shelf components may not work together due to the lack of a dynamic be-
havioural compatibility, resulting in mismatch between their protocols, and often
deadlocks.
Expressing a precise behaviour requires a solid mathematical background. For-
mal methods aim at defining a system without ambiguity, so that formal tools, im-
plementing either theorem proving or model-checking, can be used to bring strong
guaranties on the program properties. For being usable in real-life programming
environments, these methods require support from automatic software tools which
hide the complexity of the underlying logics from the developer. Although we can
find success cases in the hardware industry, the usage of formal methods and of
verification tools is still limited when it comes to software.
Compared to classical (sequential) software development, the context of dis-
tributed components is more complex because of the intricate interaction between
the distributed parts of an application. This requires specific care in handling asyn-
chrony, remote failures, communication delays, etc. On the other hand, component
frameworks provide both a programming model that helps the developer to abstract
away from the details of the underlying execution platform, and tools for support-
ing these abstractions (description languages, middle-ware layers providing strong
behavioural guaranties, etc.).
Amongst the research work being done on the formalisation of distributed com-
ponent behaviour, the closest to our motivations certainly is the one developed by
the Sofa team [17], similar to the Fractal component model. In Sofa, components
have a frame (specification) and an architecture (implementation) protocols, and
verification is done through a trace language inclusion of the architecture within the
target frame. In a different flavor, the work of Carrez et al on behavioural typing of
components [7] defines a sound assembly and compatibility concepts which ensure
correctness of the composition, but in a framework based on the Corba component
model CCM [15], where they have no hierarchy of components.
There exist a number of verification platforms for process algebras. The only
one supporting behaviours of hierarchical components that we are aware of is Sofa;
it includes a static analysis module based on the Java Path Finder tool, and a
home-made model-checker implementing the Sofa compliance relation. The main
difference with our approach is that being based on a trace language semantics,
they have no support for (congruent) minimization of state space.
We made slightly different choices: our models are based on bisimulation theo-
ries, and we take advantage of their congruence properties, together with the struc-
turing capability of hierarchical components, to keep the state-space complexity of
our models manageable. In the last years our work has been concentrated in the
automatic building of behavioural models for distributed component systems. In
[3] we introduced a new semantic model named pNet extending the networks of
communicating automata [1], by adding parameters to their communication events
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and processes in the spirit of symbolic transition graphs [13]. In [4] we used pNets
to model the behaviour of Fractal (synchronous) components, including the repre-
sentation of the Fractal “non-functional operations” for the dynamic management
of the component assemblies. Then in [5] we extended this work to the distributed
implementation of Fractal using the ProActive library, which features asynchronous
communication between distributed components.
This paper presents the implementation of those ideas, using the principles de-
scribed in the previous papers. We are building a platform called Vercors for semi-
automatic verification of distributed hierarchical components, integrating our model
generation algorithms with the verification toolbox CADP [10].
Fig. 1. Principles of the Vercors platform
Fig. 1 presents the principles of our platform: on the left side are the user
inputs, consisting of the specification of the functional behaviour for the primitive
components, and the architecture description. From these files, the tools build a
parameterized model in pNet format. The next step consists in instantiating this
model, using finite partitions of the parameter domains, currently provided by the
user (though this information could possibly be inferred from the syntax of the
property to be proved). This gives us a finite hierarchical network of LTSs, that is
finaly translated into the input format suitable for the tools of the CADP verification
toolbox.
Note on abstractions: there are two different notions of abstractions in the
method supported by our platform. The first one is that the user-provided spec-
ifications are based on “simple types” (essentialy enumerated types, integers, and
record types), abstracting away from the user-defined classes that occurs in the im-
plementation; providing tool assistance for this level is not addressed in this paper,
but it is assumed that they are proper abstract interpretations of the user types.
The second abstraction level goes from parameterized to finite systems: a finite in-
stantiation of a parameterized model is an abstraction in the sense of [8]. Starting
with first order (countable) data domains, we define abstractions as partitions in
which the abstract domain has values corresponding to a finite number of distin-
guished concrete values, plus one or more extra values representing the rest of the
concrete domain. Abstract domains are equiped with abstract operators, and these
abstractions define Galois insertions. We apply these kind of abstractions for the
domains of value-passing variables, keeping enough abstract values in the abstract
domains to represent each distinguished value of the parameter in the formula. In
[8] the authors prove that this preserves safety and liveness properties in branching
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time logics. We also apply the same abstraction scheme for parameters specifying
the topology of our systems; in this case, the [8] theorem is not applicable (the result
cannot be generalised to arbitrary values of the parameters), and the diagnostics
should be considered with a lot of care, but can still be useful as “debugging hints”.
We illustrate the platform functionality through the verification of a realistic
case-study provided by France Telecom, previously analysed by the Sofa team in
Prague [16]. This example has several qualities that motivated its choice for this
paper: first it is extracted from a realistic case-study, that will hopefully be part of a
standard set of examples provided to the whole Fractal community for comparisons.
Secondly it is small enough for a description in a 15 pages paper, but big enough to
illustrate some model size issues. Last it is suitable to illustrate some of the features
we wanted to show, including the treatment of parameters, and the modelling of
multicast interfaces.
The next section is a short explanation of the case-study, that will be used
to illustrate each functionality of the tools in the sequel of the paper. Then we
present in details the various tools in the verification chain, and the input and
intermediate formats used. In section 4 we sketch the work in progress and the new
functionalities planned for the next version, that will most probably be available
before the workshop. In section 5 we describe more directions for future work, that
will come in complement to the functionalities already in the platform.
2 Case Study Description
The Charles University in Prague, in collaboration with France Telecom, has devel-
oped a prototype implementation of a WiFi Internet access system using the Fractal
component model [16]. We demonstrate how our Vercors platform can be used to
verify parts of the specification and to provide diagnostics for the designer.
For simplicity we focus only on a subset of the system. It consists in a client
(identified by an IP address), who tries to connect to a wireless network providing
Internet access. Any client accessing a web page should be at first authenticated;
if not, the client end ups in a login web page. At the login page, the user is asked
either a valid ticket id, or a frequent flyer id (if the user is registered in a frequent
flyer programme). Once authenticated, the user is granted access to any web page
he desires until his time-lease expires.
Web
Server
Internet
Arbitrator
IAccess
ILogin
IInternet
Access
Policy
ILogin
Firewall
User(ip)
IFTAuth
IReconfigure
FrequentFlyer
FreqFlyer
Database
Classifier
FlyTicket
IDBQuery
IRedirect
IDBQuery
FreqFlyer
Classifier
DB 2
DB 1
IDBQuery
Fig. 2. The airport basic architecture
For the authentication process, the system must query either: 1) the appropriate
4
Barros - Cansado - Madelaine - Rivera
airline database for a given ticket id, or 2) all airline databases for a given frequent
flyer id. In the first case it returns the requested ticket, otherwise it returns the
longest time-lease from the tickets collected during the query.
The architecture of interest can be seen in Fig. 2. The main component inside
the Firewall is AccessPolicy, which routes the traffic between the WebServer and
the Internet based on the firewall rules.
The Arbitrator is responsible for the authentication process. It queries FlyT-
icketClassifier for 1) and FrequentFlyer for 2), and then sends back the new access
policies to the Firewall.
The ticket id has an airline identifier which is used by the FlyTicketClassifier
to query an appropriate airline database, whereas the frequent flyer id does not.
Therefore, the FrequentFlyer must broadcast to all databases the given id, gather all
the results and select one. The broadcast is handled by the FrequentFlyerDatabase,
while the selection of the longer-lasting lease is done by FrequentFlyerClassifier.
3 Platform Overview
Our verification platform comprises several tools for assisting the whole process of
verification. Rather than creating a new model-checker, we implement our model-
generation methods in a way that will be efficiently integrated with existing state-
of-art tools for checking component specifications.
Fig. 3. The VERCORS architecture
Fig. 3 gives a snapshot of the platform. In the next sections we shall describe
in details its three parts: the input from the user (3.1), the behavioural model
generation (3.2) and the verification of properties (3.3). We illustrate our platform
through the formal verification of the previously outlined case study.
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3.1 User Input
The architecture shown in Fig. 2 is specified in a XML file using the Architecture
Description Language (Fractal ADL). This file specifies the deployment topology of
the component system. It defines: the component nature (primitive or composite),
its content (primitive code or subcomponents); client and server interfaces of each
component; bindings between interfaces at deployment. A small extract of the ADL
can be seen in Listing 1.
Listing 1: Part of the ADL file for the Firewall component
<component name="Firewall">
<interface signature="IAccess" role="server" name="IAccess"/>
<interface signature="IReconfiguration" role="server" name="IReconfiguration"/>
<interface signature="ILogin" role="client" name="ILogin"/>
<component name="WebServer">
<interface signature="IRedirect" role="server" name="IRedirect"/>
<controller desc="primitive"/>
</component>
...
<binding client="AccessPolicy.IRedirect" server="WebServer.IRedirect"/>
<controller desc="composite"/>
</component>
The user should also provide the signatures of the component interfaces. Frac-
tal defines an Interface definition language (IDL), but in the implementations we
consider, we use Java interfaces, describing the signatures of the methods of each
component Interface.
The last input requested from the user is a description of the functional be-
haviour of primitive components specified in an automata based language (currently
LOTOS).
For instance, Listing 2 shows how the main method encoding the activity of the
component (runActivity for ProActive) is modelled by a process (ACCESSPOLI-
CYBODY), which offers synchronisations for every method of its server interfaces.
Parameters are given by Sorts ranging over their abstract domain and interfaces are
encoded by gates where the synchronisation offers take place.
Listing 2: AccessPolicy.lotos
behaviour ACCESSPOLICYBODY[IACCESS,IRECONF,IREDIRECT,...]({} of Rules)
where
process METHOD GET[IREDIRECT,IACCESS,...](rules: Rules, ip:IP, m:MethodGet) : exit(Rules) :=
let url :URL = getURL(m) in
[( url eq url(0)) or ( ip NotIn rules)] −>
( IREDIRECT !C(redirectPage(ip)) of IRedirect;
IREDIRECT !ip !url(0);
IACCESS !ip !url(0);
exit( rules ) )
[] [( ip IsIn rules )] −> ...
endproc
process ACCESSPOLICYBODY[IACCESS,IRECONF,IREDIRECT,...](rules: Rules): noexit :=
(( choice ip :IP [] choice url :URL []
( IACCESS !ip !C(get(url)) of IAccess;
METHOD GET[IREDIRECT,IINTERNET,IACCESS](rules,ip,get(url)) )
) []
( choice ip :IP []
( IRECONF !C(DisablePortBlock(ip)) of IReconfiguration;
METHOD DISABLEPORTBLOCK(rules,DisablePortBlock(ip)) ))
...
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LOTOS enables us to express transition systems with parameters, and is a natu-
ral choice for interfacing with the CADP toolset. Yet many other automaton-based
language could be used here and we are envisaging to provide a notation that would
be easier for non-specialists.
3.2 Building the Model
We take a two-fold approach: 1) the architecture and hierarchy information is
extracted from the ADL analysis, and 2) each of the primitive’s functional behaviour
is specified by the Vercors user in an automata based language.
We start the analysis with the description of a composite component, specified
in an ADL file. The user can select a node in the component tree, and the tool will
analyse from this layer down through the hierarchy.
3.2.1 Parameterized Model
The construction begins by giving the ADL file to ADL2N, which is a tool written in
Java for the ADL analysis of Fractal components. ADL2N obtains the possible actions
on the component’s interfaces by introspection of the Java interfaces provided as
the signature of the component’s interfaces in the ADL file. ADL2N searches the
classes of such Java interfaces in its classpath.
The output of the ADL analysis is a hierarchical synchronisation network with
parameterized actions [3]. A synchronisation network is a form of generalised par-
allel operator, where each of its arguments is typed by a Sort that is the set of its
possible observable actions. The allowed interactions between the sub-components
are given by a synchronisation constraint, namely a finite set of synchronisation
vectors, which is a subset of the Cartesian product of the sub-component’s inter-
face actions. The sub-components behaviours are the actual automata filling the
network’s arguments.
Our parameterized actions have a rich structure, and they can encode value
passing in the communication actions, assignment of state variables, and indexes
denoting process families.
Firewallir lle air lle air lle a
AccessPolicyliccess cliccess cliccess c
WebServerr re e er re e er re e e
InternetI t r te eI t r te eI t r te e
!loginWithFlyTicketId(ip,database,ticketId)!l i it l i tI (i , t ,ti tI )c e a a ase c e!l i it l i tI (i , t ,ti tI )c e a a ase c e!l i it l i tI (i , t ,ti tI )c e a a ase c e
!get_req(ip,url)! t r (i , rl)e e! t r (i , rl)e e! t r (i , rl)e e
?get_resp(ip,url)t r (i , rl)? e est r (i , rl)? e est r (i , rl)? e es
!logout(ip)!l t(i )!l t(i )!l t(i )
!enablePortBlock(ip)! l rt l (i )e a e c! l rt l (i )e a e c! l rt l (i )e a e c
!disablePortBlock(ip)! i l rt l (i )sa e c! i l rt l (i )sa e c! i l rt l (i )sa e c
!loginWithFlyTicketId(ip,database,ticketId)!l i it l i tI (i , t ,ti tI )c e a a ase c e!l i it l i tI (i , t ,ti tI )c e a a ase c e!l i it l i tI (i , t ,ti tI )c e a a ase c e
!logout(ip)!l t(i )!l t(i )!l t(i )
!redirectPage_req(ip)!r ir t r (i )e ec a e e!r ir t r (i )e ec a e e!r ir t r (i )e ec a e e
?redirectPage_resp(ip,url)r ir t r (i , rl)? e ec a e esr ir t r (i , rl)? e ec a e esr ir t r (i , rl)? e ec a e es
!get_req(ip,url)! t r (i , rl)e e! t r (i , rl)e e! t r (i , rl)e e
?get_resp(ip,url)t r (i , rl)? e est r (i , rl)? e est r (i , rl)? e es
Fig. 4. Firewall pNet obtained by ADL analysis
For instance, the network resulting of the ADL analysis for the component Fire-
7
Barros - Cansado - Madelaine - Rivera
wall in Listing 1 is shown in Fig. 4. The arrows herein represent synchronizations
between pNets, and you can observe that methods invocations that return results are
encoded by two separate edges with corresponding events (e.g. get req(ip,url)
and get resp(ip,url)).
For addressing as early as possible the well-known issue of state-explosion, we
include in ADL2N a number of hiding and abstraction techniques. Hiding is used
by individually selecting which method calls the user wants to observe, while the
others become unobservable. Data domain abstraction has been discussed in the
introduction.
In practice, the user of ADL2N will use the tool GUI to specify at the same
time the methods that will be visible, the parameters that are significant, and the
finite instantiations of those parameters. ADL2N then creates two files: a pNet
in hierarchical Parameterized FC2 format expressing the synchronisations between
components and an instantiation file defining the domain abstractions.
The FC2 format was created in the nineties as a mean of communication between
several software tools in the process algebra area [14]. It allows for description of
labelled transition systems and networks of such. Automata are tables of states,
each state being in turn a table of outgoing transitions with target indexes; networks
are vectors of references to subcomponents (i.e., to other tables), together with
synchronisation vectors (legible combinations of subcomponent behaviours acting
in synchronised fashion). Subcomponents can be networks themselves, allowing
hierarchical description.
We have defined Parameterized FC2 as an instance of FC2, using the extension
mechanism of the FC2 syntax and adding elements for parameters and operators
(reference manual in [2]). It is a textual format for compatibility reasons, but not
intended to be written by humans. It has the advantages of being structured and
compact, and that one given parameterized model could later be transformed using
different instantiations.
3.2.2 Finite model, and choice of an instantiation
The next step is to instantiate the parameterized model using finite abstract do-
mains for its parameters. This abstraction is defined by the user during the inter-
action with ADL2N.
Fig. 5. The ADL2N tool
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For simplifying the presentation in this paper, we consider a system with only one
user (this is not an abstraction of a multi-user system). For the other parameters,
we follow the finite abstraction principle described in the introduction, for which
abstract domains represent full partitions of the domains. There are 3 distinguished
values for the possible web pages url: one for the login page, one for the web page
requested by the user in the Internet and a third one for every other possible web
page. We shall consider only 2 ticket ids, one encoding a distinguished ticket given
by the user and the other for remaining tickets. Since only the distinguished ticket
is valid, then the authentication is granted only if the system successes in finding
this ticket. For the validity of the tickets, a boolean representing a valid/invalid
ticket is enough as we do not take into consideration the time control. Similarly, the
system has two databases, one representing the database with the ticket needed.
The parameterized network is the input for the tool FC2Instantiate. Given
a system of communicating LTSs with parameters and the domain of its unbound
parameters, FC2Instantiate is a Java tool that generates a finite system of com-
municating automata by translating each of the parameters to all the values in its
domain. The output is in FC2 format.
3.2.3 Interoperability with Verification Tools
Up to now we have described several transformations and tools, from the user-level
specifications to the behavioural semantics, and to a finite instantiation, using our
pNets formal model. Now we connect to the input format of various verification
tools.
We use several engines from the CADP toolbox in our verification process. Being
based on process algebras theory, the CADP toolbox provides among many others: a
compiler for high-level protocol descriptions written in the ISO language LOTOS,
on-the-fly capabilities, distributed space-generation and several diagnostics. All
these features, although not originally intended at component verification, fit nicely
within our platform for such purposes.
We provide a Java tool called FC2EXP, that translates our sets of synchroni-
sation vectors from FC2 format to hierarchical EXP format [12], the format for
synchronisation vectors defined by CADP.
The LOTOS specifications of primitive components are compiled into LTSs using
the CAESAR tool of CADP. In addition, we need to map the names of the LOTOS
gates and offers with the actions specified in the pNets. Currently this is not done
automatically by our tools and must be provided by the user.
Finally, the set of LTSs containing the functional behaviour of primitives is
synchronised with the synchronisation vectors created earlier, and the behaviour of
the full system is built and verified using CADP.
The full functional behaviour is easily generated in a single desktop machine
(Pentium 4 3GHz, 1GB RAM). This model was built with all remote method calls
kept visible, Ignoring the components drawn in dash lines of the Fig. 2, the LTS of
the system has 2152 states with 6553 transitions (non-minimised) and 57 states with
114 transitions (reduced), both with 17 visible labels, while the biggest primitive
component has 5266 states with 27300 transitions. One could also reduce the size
of the various parts of the models, taking into account the set of actions that
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occur in the formulas to be proved, and using environment interfaces to reduce the
intermediate construction sizes. Finally, for bigger systems, it is possible to use the
on-the-fly facilities of CADP for the state space generation, or even to compute the
state space in a distributed manner on a computation grid.
3.3 Verification
We give here two examples of verification, the first one being a straight-forward
deadlock detection, and the other a functional verification of the firewall. For the
first one there is no need of specifying a formula, whereas in the second case a
custom property must be supplied.
3.3.1 Property 1 : Deadlock Detection
Listing 3: Diagnostics
<initial state>
""loginWithFlyTicketId(IAccess)(0,1,1)""
""loginWithFlyTicketId(ILogin)(0,1,1)""
""loginWithFlyTicketId(IAccess)(0,1,1)""
""CreateToken_req(IFTAuth)(1,1)""
""GetFlyTicketValidity_req(IFTAuth)(1,1)""
""GetFlyTicketValidity_resp(IFTAuth)(1,1)""
""CreateToken_resp(IFTAuth)(1)""
<deadlock>
In this context, our User component may login, logout or request a web page
in any order at any time. We check whether a client, before being authenticated,
is indeed routed to the WebServer no matter which page is requested, and granted
access to the Internet otherwise. We were able to find a deadlock in our model, and
the corresponding diagnostic is shown in Listing 3. Breadth-first-search is used to
find the shortest trace. We believe our platform is able to exhibit more compact
traces than the ones found by Sofa [16], that contain interleaved actions not related
to the deadlock.
3.3.2 Diagnostic Explanation
We modelled the login method as being void, which means no confirmation is sent
back to the user with his new status, thus it is natural that the client logs in again.
Supposing he does log in twice, the Arbitrator, still processing the first login call,
queries the database for the ticket information, then tries to send back the new
access policy to the Firewall. The problem arises because the latter is blocked
trying to make a second login call to the Arbitrator. It is a clear deadlock, yet
realistic and difficult to detect without exhaustive tools, that can be model-checked
with this methodology.
Remark that this interesting result was detected in a synchronous call context.
A ProActive implementation of the system would not deadlock due to asynchronous
services provided by the library. As in our current version of ADL2N asynchronous
mechanisms are not modelled, the analysis of this scenario is not yet possible. We
shall relieve this limitation as soon as the new version of ADL2N (see section 4) is
released.
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3.3.3 Property 2 : Inevitability
Here we use a µ-calculus formula to specify that a user, requesting access to a given
web page (encoded “1” in the formula), will inevitably get it:
[true*.’"get_req(IAccess)(0,1)"’]
mu X . (< true > true and [ not ’"get_resp(IAccess)(0,1)"’ ] X)
The model-checker answers “false”, and the diagnostics is shown in Fig. 6 by a
LTS encoding a counterexample.
get_req(IAccess)(0,1)t r (I )( , )e e ccesst r (I )( , )e e ccesst r (I )( , )e e ccess
redirectPage_req(IRedirect)(0)r ir t r (I ir t)( )e ec a e e e ecr ir t r (I ir t)( )e ec a e e e ecr ir t r (I ir t)( )e ec a e e e ec
redirectPage_resp(IRedirect)(0,0)r ir t r (I ir t)( , )e ec a e es e ecr ir t r (I ir t)( , )e ec a e es e ecr ir t r (I ir t)( , )e ec a e es e ec
get_resp(IAccess)(0,0)t r (I )( , )e es ccesst r (I )( , )e es ccesst r (I )( , )e es ccess
get_req(IAccess)(0,1)t r (I )( , )e e ccesst r (I )( , )e e ccesst r (I )( , )e e ccess
Fig. 6. Counterexample where the user does not receive the requested web page.
3.3.4 Diagnostic Explanation
The counterexample found reflects the user requesting a distinguished web page
before logging in. The user is blocked and redirected to the local web server, who
sends back the login page (given by the number 0).
4 Work in progress
Despite being capable of building the full functional behaviour, two strong limita-
tions can be seen in ADL2N v0.8: it does not include non-functional aspects, thus
deployment and reconfiguration errors cannot be checked; and asynchronous se-
mantics of the ProActive library are not considered. Handling these requires the
addition of specific controllers as described in [4] and [5], which can be derived from
the analysis of the ADL and Java interfaces.
The new version of the ADL2N tool includes a two-phases compilation of ADL
files. First, we create an abstract model encoding the common semantics between
different Fractal implementations. Then, all implementation-specific controllers are
added depending on the component model the user selects.
In the tool back-end, the pNets models are compiled into Parameterized FC2.
Higher-level communication primitives are translated by creating intermediate con-
trollers, similar to our non-functional controllers. As a generic pNets compiler will
be used, adding support for new controllers does not require any change in the
compiler, and extending the model is straight-forward.
Through these new design considerations, we believe our tool is easily extensible
to new Fractal implementations and future model-checkers. We will provide the
user with a tool for verifying synchronous and asynchronous implementations of
the Fractal model, and keep the user free to define other implementation-specific
controllers of interest.
5 Future work
Various tools for static analysis, model checking, and equivalence checking can op-
erate on the models we generate. One long term goal of this work is to integrate the
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various techniques and tools involved in this software platform, so that the platform
can be integrated in a development environment, and used by non-specialists. At
the same time, the platform must be flexible and open enough to serve as a basis
for easy prototyping of new techniques and tools on real Java/ProActive code.
Of particular interest are tools that deal directly with some classes of param-
eterized or infinite models. We expect to study the connection with tools such
as FAST or TReX, from the Persee Project [11]. Integrating these techniques into
our models is not trivial, but they could allow infinite (yet regular) systems to be
checked directly from the parameterized models, avoiding the state-explosion that
occurs during the instantiation.
In the domain of Grid computing where ProActive is positioned, multicast in-
terfaces take a major role and we expect that most large-scale applications exploit
these features. Therefore, they must be included in the model, and hopefully into
a higher-level specification language where architectural and communication prim-
itives are provided, so that real scenarios of distributed component verification are
possible and feasible for the users. In our case-study, this mechanism is illustrated
by the FrequentFlyer scenario (the dashed components in Fig. 2): the Frequent-
Flyer component uses broadcast and gathercast primitives to ask information to
several databases in parallel.
It is important to note that pNets can be used to model higher level commu-
nication primitives such as multicast and gathercast: it will be easy to add these
functionalities to the ADL2N tool, when these primitives will be more stable in the
Grid component model currently being defined (in the CoreGRID NoE).
Last we need more user-friendly methods for the specification of logical proper-
ties. CADP performs on-the-fly model-checking of regular alternation-free µ-calculus
formulas. Although powerful, defining these formulas is error-prone and not suit-
able for non-experts (see property in 3.3.3). Therefore, following the work done by
Dwyer et al. [9], we intend to define natural language-like patterns for component-
based specification such as AfterDeployment for meaning the temporal scope after a
successful deployment, NoErrors, ControlActions and FutureUpdate for grouping
specific actions.
6 Conclusion
Throughout this article, we have introduced our distributed component verifica-
tion platform, with hope of bringing formal verification of system’s designs to non-
specialists users. We provide models and tools to automate and hide the complexity
of formal methods, supporting the designer from user specifications up to the diag-
nostics.
The main contributions of this work are:
• An architectural presentation of the Vercors platform.
• A description of how we have implemented the model generation methods de-
scribed in previous papers in semi-automatic tools, including the input and inter-
mediate formats based on our pNets formal model, and the connections we made
with the CADP verification toolset.
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• A step-by-step example using the current version of the tools, for the model-
checking of a realistic case study.
• A discussion on what still needs to be implemented before being able to check
properties about deployment and transformation of a component-based applica-
tion.
• A discussion of research directions for enhancing the scope of the platform, in-
cluding: new types of verification engines, the addition of high level primitives
specific to distributed grid computation, and the use of user-friendly languages
for expressing user requirements.
Although our platform is not yet complete, we believe it is a step towards a
realistic automatic component verification framework. Many intermediate formats
are used through the process, but the platform is evolving to relieve the overhead
of manipulating these complex languages through the use of automatic or quasi-
automatic tools that we provide. We expect to attract ProActive users by providing
useful diagnostics of non-trivial design flaws.
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